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I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing 
the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I 
claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have 
approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other 
environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what 
obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have 
toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any 
moral obligation should be the "functional morality" of Wallach 
and Allen [20], while the upper limit of our obligations should not 
exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and 
other environmental entities. 
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1 Intelligent Machines with Moral Status? 
Intelligent machines will influence, improve, and impinge on our 
moral environment. This has roused some in the AI community, 
who realize that issues go beyond mere safety concerns 
addressable by felicitous engineering. For example, Wallach and 
Allen [20] have proposed artificial moral agents (AMAs), 
intelligent machines intended to function as if they have moral 
obligations to us. But what about the converse—the moral 
obligations that we could have to intelligent machines? Gunkel [8] 
laments the lack of attention given to this question. This 
asymmetry is especially glaring given that, in Western 
philosophy, if an entity has moral obligations to others—if an 
entity is a moral agent—then other moral agents have moral 
obligations to that entity. That is, the entity is also a moral patient 
and has moral status that other moral agents ought to take into 
account when acting with respect to the entity. Naturally, AMAs 
are not actual moral agents. Even so, might we have moral 
obligations to sufficiently intelligent machines? Of course, the 
question lurking here is whether an intelligent machine could have 
moral status.  
      The purpose of this article is to establish the possibility of 
moral status for current and readily foreseeable intelligent 
machines. Specifically, I propose a map of moral status derived 
from moral theory and show where current and foreseeable 
intelligent machines should be located in this map. This first 
requires providing some definitions and assumptions for the 
arguments that follow. 
 
Figure 1: The moral status pyramid (MSP). F: full moral status; 
SF: significant-full moral status; MS: minimal-significant moral 
status; NM: negligible-minimal moral status. Gray region 
represents entities that are both moral agents and moral patients. 
White regions represent moral patients only. Moral agency is the 
threshold for region F; sentience for region SF; having a good of 
its own for region MS. 
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2 Definitions and Assumptions 
This article employs the definition of moral status, due to 
Jaworska and Tannenbaum [9]:  “An entity has moral status if and 
only if it or its interests morally matter to some degree for the 
entity's own sake, such that it can be wronged.”  
Regarding usage of intelligent machine in this article, although 
humans and animals are sometimes considered machines, they are 
excluded for present purposes. Similarly, humans physically 
augmented by wearable, implantable, or attachable technologies, 
as well as humans working cooperatively with machines in a 
tightly integrated group, are not considered here. Roughly, 
intelligent machine, as used here, refers to a reasonably 
sophisticated product of artificial intelligence (AI) or related 
disciplines. An intelligent machine may be prominently hardware, 
as with a robot or digital computer, or primarily software, as with 
a virtual agent or software-based system. An intelligent machine 
may stand alone or be embedded in another artifact. It may be a 
collective or swarm.  It may be silicon-based or not—as with 
products from the field of synthetic biology. Further, an intelligent 
machine, for purposes of this article, could be a hybrid of two or 
more materials—a silicon-based digital computer interfaced with 
a neural circuit made from biological material, perhaps. With this 
definition of moral status and a brief clarification of the intended 
use of the term intelligent machine, I give three assumptions in 
support of ensuing arguments. 
First, I assume that it is at least possible that an intelligent 
machine could have more than mere instrumental value. The 
instrumental value of an entity is derived only from its usefulness 
in achieving the goals of some other agent (e.g., a normal adult 
human). Many are opposed to or unconvinced of the idea that a 
machine could have more than instrumental value, rejecting the 
notion that a machine could also have intrinsic value—value for 
its own sake whether others actually value it or not. Although 
intelligent machines to date have done little to undermine the 
instrumental value view, Gunkel [8] observes that the increasing 
autonomy of intelligent machines does challenge this view: 
In other words, the instrumental definition of technol-
ogy, which had effectively tethered machine action to 
human agency, no longer applies to mechanisms that 
have been deliberately designed to operate and exhibit 
some form, no matter how rudimentary, of independent 
or autonomous action. (p. 36) 
The reason is that such mechanisms:  
…directly contravene the instrumental definition by 
deliberately contesting and relocating the assignment of 
agency. Such mechanisms are not mere tools to be used 
by human agents but occupy, in one way or another, the 
place of agency. (p. 32) 
Those not swayed by Gunkel’s argument will likely also be 
unconvinced that an intelligent machine could have moral status. 
The second assumption is that moral status is not all-or-none, 
but rather that there are degrees of moral status. Jaworska and 
Tannenbaum [9] describe how either a threshold approach or a 
scalar approach may ground moral status that comes in degrees 
and explain how each approach has its drawbacks. For example, 
the threshold approach typically requires that an entity have some 
capacity in order to meet the threshold for some degree of moral 
status. This can lead to cases where an entity possessing that 
capacity, but using it poorly, could meet the threshold, while 
another entity which lacks that capacity entirely, but which may 
have a similar capacity and use it well, could fall short of the 
threshold, leaving a “gap” in the moral status between the two 
entities. Jaworska and Tannenbaum point out that it is possible to 
narrow a gap by having multiple thresholds leading to different 
degrees of moral status. The scalar approach avoids the “gap” 
problem of the threshold approach, but as they explain, it could 
lead to counterintuitive cases where it is more wrong to harm an 
intelligent person than a not-so-intelligent person. In this article, I 
use the threshold approach. 
Now, consider Figure 1. The pyramid suggests that there is a 
hierarchical ordering of the thresholds, where an entity meeting a 
higher threshold in the pyramid has a greater degree of moral 
status than an entity meeting only a lower threshold. In addition, if 
an entity meets or exceeds a given threshold, it will also 
meet/exceed all lower thresholds in the pyramid. This 
hierarchical-ordering-of-thresholds is the third assumption. 
3 Framework for Assessing the Moral Status of 
Intelligent Machines 
Figure 1 depicts a proposed map of moral status derived from 
moral theory. This map is divided into four regions: (1) F for full 
moral status; (2) SF for significant-full moral status; (3) MS for 
minimal-significant moral status; (4) NM for negligible-minimal 
moral status. Each region requires that an entity meet (or exceed) 
a certain threshold in order to be included into that region. 
According to this scheme, an entity must fall into exactly one of 
the four regions; specifically, an entity will fall into the region 
with the highest threshold that the entity meets or exceeds. Due to 
the hierarchical-ordering-of-thresholds assumption, an entity that 
meets a particular threshold will also meet all of the lower 
thresholds in the pyramid of Figure 1. For example, if an entity 
were to meet the moral agency threshold (i.e., the entity is an 
actual moral agent), the entity would meet the sentience and the “a 
good of its own” thresholds as well. The moral status pyramid 
(MSP) of Figure 1 clearly shows that the higher a threshold 
attained by an entity, the higher the degree of moral status 
accorded that entity. The MSP also illustrates the obvious fact that 
the higher the threshold, the fewer the entities capable of attaining 
that threshold.  
    Less obvious may be the observation that MSP very roughly 
tracks the anthropocentrism/nonanthropocentrism distinction of 
philosophers such as Sterba [18] and the moral agent/moral 
patient distinction of philosophers such as Gunkel [8]. By “very 
roughly” I mean that the MSP is not a high resolution rendering of 




status from the moral theory literature.1  Rather, the objective here 
is to ground the claim that an intelligent machine could have 
moral status and to argue how much moral status such a machine 
merits. 
4 Determining the Moral Status of Intelligent 
Machines Using the MSP 
4.1 Moral Agency 
I use moral agency as the threshold for classifying an intelligent 
machine as having full moral status (region F in Figure 1). This is 
not the functional moral agency (or “functional morality”) 
intended for AMAs [20]. Rather, it is the so-called “full blown” 
moral agency of moral theory. Moral agency is a murky concept. 
In considering the question of machine moral agency, Gunkel [8] 
observes: 
What has been discovered is that the concept of moral 
agency is already so thoroughly confused and messy 
that it is now unclear whether we—whoever this “we” 
includes—are in fact moral agents. What the machine 
question demonstrates, therefore, is that the question 
concerning agency, the question that had been assumed 
to be the “correct” place to begin, turns out to be 
inconclusive. (p. 91) 
Even so, we begin with moral agency. We need a reasonably 
precise, but still broad, definition of moral agency. The idea is to 
be as charitable to intelligent machines as possible in choosing 
this threshold. Thus, an intelligent machine need not possess the 
rationality, capacity to will, and presupposition of freedom of a 
Kantian [10] moral agent. Nor must it possess the rationality, 
consciousness, intentionality, and free will of the “full ethical 
agent” of Moor [14]. Deliberately setting the bar of moral agency 
relatively low, as compared to other moral theories, will show that 
current and readily foreseeable intelligent machines still cannot 
clear this bar and thus attain full moral status. 
The threshold to region F in Figure 1 is based on the work of 
Gert and Gert [7]. They propose a “schema for definitions of 
‘morality’” as follows: “…morality is the informal public system 
that all rational persons, under certain specified conditions, would 
endorse.” A public system is: “a system of norms (1) that is 
knowable by all those to whom it applies and (2) that is not 
irrational for any of those to whom it applies to follow (Gert 2005: 
                                                                
1 For example, with respect to the anthropocentrism/nonanthropocentrism distinction 
of Sterba [18], I am not claiming that Sterba would choose moral agency as the 
threshold for full moral status, nor am I claiming that he would subscribe to my 
hierarchical-ordering-of-thresholds assumption. Further, his claim that species and 
ecosystems have moral status may not be captured by region MS in my Figure 1. 
With respect to the moral agent/moral patient distinction discussed in Gunkel [8], 
note that region SF in my Figure 1 roughly corresponds to his discussion of the 
extension of moral status to animals. My choice of sentience as the threshold for an 
entity to be included in region SF is exactly the sentience due to Singer [17], which is 
used to justify animal rights. However, Singer, with an utilitarian insistence on equal 
considerability (although not necessarily equal treatment), would not endorse the 
idea that moral agents (region F in Figure 1) automatically have greater moral status 
than animals. Finally, Rachels [15] gives a non-traditional, but persuasive, account of 
moral status that my Figure 1 may not capture at all. 
10)” [7]. Further, in an informal public system, there is no 
authority and no decision procedure for specifying exactly what to 
do in all situations. For Gert and Gert then, it appears that a moral 
agent must be a “rational person” able to “endorse” the informal 
public system “under certain specified conditions.” The ability to 
meet these criteria is the formulation of “moral agency” used as 
the threshold to region F in the Moral Status Pyramid. 
Note that their schema for morality is very broad—Gert and 
Gert [7] intend this schema, not as a moral theory in itself, but as a 
source of normative definitions of morality that in turn can serve 
as the bases of a variety of moral theories. They argue that their 
schema adequately captures conceptions of morality as diverse as 
Kant’s and Mill’s. In addition, Gert and Gert explain how natural 
law theory (as well as some Divine Command theories based on 
natural law theory) and some versions of virtue theory are covered 
by the umbrella of their schema. Although they recognize that 
their schema for morality may not supply the foundation for all 
moral theories, it seems that their morality schema is broad 
enough to support a wide variety of moral agents operating under 
various moral theories and codes. Thus, the formulation of “moral 
agency” from the preceding paragraph should serve as a charitable 
threshold in evaluating intelligent machines for full moral status 
(region F in Figure 1). 
This formulation, however, ensures that no foreseeable 
intelligent machine will attain the classification of full moral 
status. The “person” requirement is the culprit. Dennett [5], in 
referring to the concept “person,” observes: 
One might well hope that such an important concept, 
applied and denied so confidently, would have clearly 
formulatable necessary and sufficient conditions for 
ascription, but if it does, we have not yet discovered 
them. In the end there may be none to discover. In the 
end we may come to realize that the concept person is 
incoherent and obsolete. (p. 267) 
One might suggest replacing “person” with some less 
controversial term in the Gert and Gert [7] morality schema, but 
as Gunkel [8] explains, “…philosophers, medical ethicists, animal 
rights activists, and others have often sought to differentiate what 
constitutes a person from the human being in an effort to extend 
moral consideration to previously excluded others.” Taking up 
Dennett’s challenge, Gunkel reviews the criteria for personhood 
advanced by various authors and discovers that consciousness is 
on all these lists in some form. Further, it is typical to consider 
consciousness as a requirement for moral agency (pp. 46-48). The 
reason is “because consciousness is considered one of the decisive 
characteristics, dividing between a merely accidental occurrence 
and a purposeful act that is directed and understood by the 
individual agent who decides to do it.” (p. 47) Unfortunately, it is 
also difficult to specify just what consciousness is. 
At the moment, it is reasonable to conclude that no current or 
foreseeable intelligent machine meets the moral agency threshold. 
In spite of attempting to define this threshold charitably, there are 
still two ontological problems: consensus on how to (1) define 
“person” and (2) define perhaps its main criterion, 
“consciousness.” Even if these two problems can be solved, there 
 
 
remains the epistemological problem of determining whether 
another entity truly possesses consciousness. 
4.2 Sentience 
In the context of moral status, “consciousness” typically means 
phenomenal consciousness. Qualia—“the introspectible qualities 
of our experiences”—give rise to ‘what it is like to be’ a particular 
thing: a human, a bat, a dog, etc.; if a thing has a “state with 
qualia”, it has phenomenal consciousness [12]. Phenomenal 
consciousness sometimes is discussed along with other properties 
such as sentience [17], desires and preferences [11], intentionality 
[21], etc. Regarding the threshold for classifying an intelligent 
machine into region SF (Figure 1), I propose that the entity must 
have just enough phenomenal consciousness to experience 
pleasure and pain. This threshold is the “sentience” due to Singer 
[17]. My assumption is that a more richly phenomenally 
conscious entity, one with desires, preferences, intentionality, etc., 
would also experience pleasure and pain, but perhaps not vice 
versa.2 If this assumption is correct, then this choice of threshold 
is charitable with respect to the question of deciding whether an 
entity possesses phenomenal consciousness—and charitable with 
respect to determining whether an intelligent machine belongs in 
region SF of the MSP. Despite this, it is unlikely that foreseeable 
intelligent machines will fall into region SF.  
There is a well-known epistemic problem: determining 
whether an entity actually is phenomenally conscious, even in the 
limited sense of being able to feel pleasure and pain. This problem 
arises because we can only observe the behavior of another entity, 
without access to its private and subjective mental world (if any). 
For example, it could be that an entity merely simulates the 
feeling of pleasure or pain, using appropriate behavioral 
responses, without actually experiencing pleasure or pain. In 
discussing whether animals are sentient, DeGrazia [4] claims that 
evidence supports the ability of vertebrates to feel pain, but that 
this is still an open question for “all but the most ‘advanced’ 
invertebrates.” He adds:  
…the evidence available today is too indeterminate to 
justify confidently drawing the line between sentient 
and non-sentient animals in any specific place, although 
it is virtually certain that some invertebrates, such as 
amoebas, are non-sentient. (p. 44) 
If it is difficult to draw this line for animals, it is not clear why it 
would be less difficult to draw this line for machines. Thus, it 
likely will be very difficult to reach consensus on whether an 
intelligent machine actually is sentient.  
4.3 A Good of Its Own 
Some are willing to grant moral status to a non-conscious entity 
with “a good of its own.” For example, they would allow that my 
oak tree has moral status. Its good manifests itself in its continued 
survival, growth, and reproduction. In self-maintenance, it drops 
                                                                
2 For example, Kaufman [11] argues that Singer’s sentience is not sufficient for an 
entity to have preferences. 
large branches in my yard when faced with a season of drought or 
the insult of the city cutting some of its roots to modernize the city 
sewer system. Regarding its reproductive ends, it pelts my house 
in late summer with acorns. It does these things in the service of 
what it means to be an oak tree, presumably without any 
consciousness and without regard to the ends or good of anyone 
or anything else. 
One could say that a conscious person and my oak tree both 
have interests. In Kaufman’s [11] view, “morality is centrally, if 
not essentially, concerned with assessing benefits or harms 
resulting from the actions of moral agents.” According to 
Kaufman, because benefits or harms only matter to entities with 
interests, it is just such entities that are candidates for moral 
status. Kaufman [11] claims that there are “two distinct senses of 
what it means to have an interest”: (1) desires and (2) “a good or a 
well-being.” Desires (actual, potential, or idealized) require what 
Kaufman refers to as “mentality.” Assuming that if an entity has 
desires, then the entity is sentient, the entity would belong to 
region SF (assuming also that it is not a moral agent).  
Mentality, on the other hand, is not required to have “a good or 
a well-being.” In summarizing claims from environmental 
philosophy, Kaufman [11] states: 
Environmental philosophers have ascribed interests to 
such things as plants, other forms of life, whole species, 
and ecosystems. The good or well-being of these things 
is said to consist in their achieving their respective ends. 
Some authors talk about such natural entities as having 
a telos, and our respectful recognition of these ends is 
taken as a basic moral insight. (pp. 59-60) 
Using my oak tree again as an example, it has a telos—an end or 
purpose—to survive. One good for it is water; another good for it 
is not to have its roots damaged. Neither a drought nor having its 
roots cut is good for my tree; neither is in my tree’s interest in 
staying alive.  
On such accounts, Kaufman [11] argues that machines, like 
living things, also can have a good or well-being, ends, and 
interests, but emphasizes how environmental philosophers are 
loathe to grant moral status to machines for the reason that, unlike 
living things, a machine’s good and ends are not its own, but 
rather are derived from human ends. His rejoinder is that human 
goals may be “imposed from without” (e.g., by “a function of 
upbringing and enculturation”). He concludes that: 
The mere fact that one’s ends are not one’s own is not a 
good reason for denying that interests can nevertheless 
depend upon those ends. The same holds for machines: 
the claim that their ends are derived from our ends, that 
they have no ends of their own, is irrelevant in 
determining whether or not they are able to have 
interests. (p. 63) 
An objection that avoids Kaufman’s argument is that machines 
have no ends at all, rather than ends which happen to be 
derivative. Kaufman [11] concedes that talk of a machine’s having 
ends may be just convenient shorthand, which, if necessary, could 
be replaced by more formal mechanistic descriptions of the 




the case for naturally occurring organisms, that we may talk in 
terms of their ends merely because of our poor understanding of 
the mechanistic processes regulating their behavior.  
Perhaps just for this reason, explanation in terms of an end or 
telos seems no longer sufficient. According to Basl and Sandler 
[1], explanation of the etiology of ends is also required: 
Appeals to teleological organization are a step toward 
explicating the basis and content of nonsentient 
organisms’ good. However, it is also necessary to 
provide an explanation for the teleological organization; 
one that demonstrates that the teleological organization 
of plants isn’t merely imagined. … The most prominent 
and most plausible explanation of the source of 
teleology in nonsentient biological organisms appeals to 
an etiological account of functions (Cahen 2002; Varner 
1998).  
According to etiological accounts of function, a part or 
trait of an organism has the function of doing F only if it 
was selected for doing F. (p. 93) 
They give the example of a heart, the function of which is to 
pump blood only if it was selected for pumping blood. Natural 
selection is operative for organisms, but Basl and Sandler argue 
that any “selection for” will work to ground the etiological 
account of function in justifying an entity’s telos. This opens the 
door for an artifact—perhaps an intelligent machine—to have 
interests and a good of its own. 
A robot experiment by Briggs and Scheutz [3] illustrates. 
Their research goal is to incorporate “felicity conditions” into a 
robot so that it may disobey unclear, ambiguous, and even 
deliberately deceptive instructions from a human. Felicity 
conditions are “contextual factors that inform whether an 
individual can and should do something.” Briggs and Scheutz 
equipped a NAO robot with a set of felicity conditions for 
determining whether to comply with an order. One such condition 
is: “Does it violate any normative or ethical principle for me to do 
X, including the possibility I might be subjected to inadvertent or 
needless damage?” They placed the robot on a tabletop and gave 
it commands such as “sit.” The robot complied. When close to the 
table edge and ordered to walk off the table, however, the robot 
disobeyed until it was coaxed off the table into the arms of the 
researcher. Even though the purpose of their experiment was to 
test robot disobedience and not to establish that the endowed 
NAO robot has a good of its own, it seems that the robot, though 
not conscious, does have a telos: to remain intact. This telos is 
justified by an etiological account of function. The function of the 
set of felicity conditions is to allow the robot to disobey an 
improper order, and this function was selected for by the 
researchers. Thus, the endowed NAO robot appears to have 
interests and a good of its own. 
One may object that Basl and Sandler [1] are too loose in 
allowing anything other than natural selection to count with 
respect to a function being “selected for.” Is there some 
distinction between artifact and organism that would allow only 
an organism to have a good of its own?  
An obvious distinction between an artifact, as we have 
typically known them, and an organism is that the organism is 
alive. Basl and Sandler [1] make a persuasive argument that the 
“living/nonliving distinction” is not relevant by showing how 
internal organization, goal-directedness, and dynamism—three 
features they claim are important for living entities—are also 
found in some nonliving artifacts.  
Even if their argument does not dissuade one from belief that 
there is a distinction between organism and artifact, products of 
synthetic biology, which are both artifact and organism, confuse 
this distinction. As a result, Sandler’s [16] natural-artifactual 
continuum seems more appropriate than a hard distinction. If such 
products are organisms, then, it seems, they do have a good of 
their own [1]. Can these “artifactual organisms” be considered 
machines? 
One could argue that a machine is just a type of artifact—
therefore, whatever holds for artifacts, holds for machines as well. 
Boldt and Müller [2] express concern about a premature 
conflation of ‘life’ and ‘machine’ though, due to the traditional 
association of ‘life’ with ‘value.’ Their concern is that this “may 
in the (very) long run lead to a weakening of society’s respect for 
higher forms of life that are usually regarded as worthy of 
protection.” Thus, they caution synthetic biology researchers and 
commentators to be careful with ‘machine’ metaphors. Although 
their underlying concern seems legitimate, machine metaphors in 
synthetic biology soon may be obsolete. Synthetic biologists have 
already created cells that perform basic logic operations, count, 
add, and serve as crude memories; some anticipate that within the 
next five years biocomputers made from such raw living materials 
might be ready for use in diagnosing and treating certain diseases 
[13]. If so, then arguably these would not be machine metaphors, 
but rather genuine machines. Further, although early 
biocomputers will be primitive, slow, and inaccurate in 
comparison to their electronic counterparts, they are expected to 
be capable of interacting with the natural world in ways not 
possible for electronic computers [13]. 
In summary, it seems plausible that an intelligent machine 
could meet the threshold of having a good of its own. This would 
place current and foreseeable intelligent machines into region MS 
of the MSP (Figure 1). 
5 Moral Obligations to Intelligent Machines? 
If the reasoning so far is correct, current and foreseeable 
intelligent machines could have moral status. Could we, as moral 
agents, have obligations to such machines? Consider the sort of 
‘lifeboat dilemma’ typical of philosophy: assume a lifeboat has 
room for just one more occupant, either an intelligent machine or 
another normal adult human (or perhaps, instead, a pet animal). 
Intuitively, many of us would want morality to dictate that the 
machine be tossed overboard in favor of the additional human (or 
family pet). If the intelligent machine belongs in region MS of the 
MSP, as argued, then morality and intuition coincide. The 
machine has less moral status than the human moral agent or 
sentient animal. Thus, to a first approximation, the upper bound of 
 
 
our moral obligations to an intelligent machine seems prudent. 
What about a lower bound to such obligations though? Torrance 
[19] warns, for example, about the potential human cost of 
erroneous ascription of moral status to “artificial beings.” 
Basl and Sandler [1] point out that even if an entity has moral 
status, this does not mean that moral agents necessarily must have 
“much if any concern.” The information ethics (IE) of Floridi [6] 
goes beyond environmental ethics by including anything that 
exists as “worth some initial, perhaps minimal and overridable, 
form of moral respect.” (See Figure 1, region NM as a possible 
location of moral status for such entities.) The point that these 
authors seem to be making is that some entities could have moral 
status, but that the actual obligations of a moral agent to such 
entities could be negligible. As argued here, current and 
foreseeable intelligent machines fall into region MS of the MSP. 
Even some non-intelligent machines [11] may qualify as having a 
good of their own, placing them into region MS as well. Which 
machines make obligations upon us as moral agents? I propose 
two criteria: the machine must be an intelligent machine as 
discussed here and the machine must possess the “functional 
morality,” or functional moral agency, described by Wallach and 
Allen [20]. By analogy with actual moral agency, which sets a 
high bar for moral status, functional morality could be an 
appropriate lower bound for establishing a moral status high 
enough within region MS for us to take seriously any moral 
obligations to machines. After all, an intelligent machine with the 
functional morality of Wallach and Allen would be an active, 
autonomous (in some respect) agent operating in the moral world 
that we inhabit. 
6 Conclusion 
Current and foreseeable intelligent machines could have the 
approximate moral status of environmental entities, such as plants 
and trees (see region MS of Figure 1). I propose that the only 
machines, for which we may have meaningful moral obligations, 
are intelligent machines that embody the “functional morality” of 
Wallach and Allen [20]. The limit of obligations to such 
intelligent machines will fall short of our obligations to entities 
that are sentient. 
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